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Abstract
This paper analyzes the economic impact of unions on productivity in the manu-
facturing sector across six Latin American countries: Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, 
Mexico, Uruguay, and Panama. Using an augmented Cobb-Douglas production 
function, the paper finds that unions have positive, but mostly small, effects on 
productivity, with the exception of Argentina, with a large negative effect, and 
Bolivia, with no effect. An analysis on profitability shows that, in most cases, 
the positive productivity effects barely offset higher union compensation, and 
that unions are negatively related to investment in capital and R & D. Different 
explanations for these effects are discussed.
Resumen 
Este artículo analiza el impacto económico de los sindicatos sobre la producti-
vidad en el sector manufacturero en seis países de América Latina: Argentina, 
Bolivia, Chile, México, Uruguay y Panamá. Utilizando una función de producción 
aumentada de Cobb-Douglas, el documento encuentra que los sindicatos tienen 
efectos positivos, pero sobre todo pequeños, sobre la productividad, con la excep-
ción de Argentina, con un gran efecto negativo, y Bolivia, sin efecto. Un análisis 
de la rentabilidad muestra que, en la mayoría de los casos, los efectos positivos 
de la productividad apenas compensan una indemnización sindical más alta, y 
que los sindicatos están relacionados negativamente con la inversión en capital 
y en I + D. En el artículo se discuten diferentes explicaciones de estos efectos.
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INTRODUCTION 
One of the most contentious debates in the literature on unions has been on how unions affect a 
firm’s performance. While most of the literature agrees that unions have mostly negative effects on 
profitability and investment, there is little consensus on the effects that unions have on productivity 
(Kuhn 1998; Doucouliagos and Laroche 2003, 2009; Aidt and Tzannatos 2002; Hirsch 2004). To some 
extent, the uncertainty surrounding these issues reflects problems with data limitations, as well as 
the underlying heterogeneity in union effects across establishments, industries, and countries. 
Although there is a reasonably large literature for several developed economies, there is little evi-
dence regarding “what unions do” for establishment productivity in developing economies.1 Because 
businesses in developing economies face different types of obstacles, such as restrictions on access 
to capital, unfavorable institutions, high levels of corruption, less competitive markets, and unstable 
business environments, compared to those in developed countries, it is not clear how unions affect 
productivity. 
The purpose of this paper is to expand the literature by analyzing the impact of unions on pro-
ductivity for six countries in Latin America, namely Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Mexico, Panama, and 
Uruguay. Differences in their economic settings and adaptation to market reforms provide a mixture 
of settings which suggests a cross-country study may prove valuable to better understand the rela-
tionship between unions and productivity.
Using data from the World Bank Enterprise Survey, modified Cobb-Douglas production functions 
are estimated to determine the impact of unionization on establishment productivity, controlling for 
various measures of establishment characteristics. Due to considerable levels of non-reporting in the 
survey, a “principled” multiple imputation approach is used to improve the completeness and reliability 
of the data. The preferred model indicates that unions have slightly positive but mostly insignificant 
effects on productivity, with Chile and Panama showing the largest, but not significant, union-produc-
tivity effects. The exception is Argentina, where the estimates are negative and statistically significant 
across all specifications. Alternative measures of unionization reveal that the union-productivity 
relationship is not linear in all countries, which has contributed to the low significance of the results.
The analysis of profitability indicates that in most countries the small gains in productivity are 
not large enough to offset the higher wage costs faced by unionized establishments. In Bolivia, the 
profit and productivity evidence is not closely aligned, which seems to be driven by substantial di-
fferences on capital intensity. Similarly, the evidence suggests that unions are negatively associated 
with measures investment and innovation.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The first section presents a review of the empirical 
literature, with emphasis on the research done for Latin America. The second section presents a brief 
description of the history of unions in Latin America and describes the legal framework under which 
unions operate in each country. The third and fourth sections describe the data and the empirical 
strategy. The fifth and sixth sections present results on productivity and performance analysis. 
Section seven concludes.
1 As Freeman (2010) indicates, the research for developing economies is limited because data for this type of research is typically 
inadequate, and also because unions in developing countries have been weak and unable to fulfill their role as bargaining agents in 
their economies.
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1. HOW DO UNIONS AFFECT PRODUCTIVITY?
1.1. Theoretical background
There is a large theoretical literature that has explored the potential costs and benefits of unions in 
terms of firm performance and productivity. Examples include Brown and Medoff (1978), Addison 
(1982), Addison and Barnett (1982), Freeman and Medoff (1984), Hirsch and Addison (1986), Turnbull 
(1991) and, more recently, Hirsch (2004) and Kaufman (2004). This literature has identified various 
channels through which unions can have positive and negative effects on productivity.
According to the “two faces” approach, popularized in Freeman and Medoff (1984), union’s effects 
on productivity can be described using the monopoly face – from microeconomic theory – and the 
collective voice/institutional response framework – from the industrial organization literature. The 
traditional approach analyzes unions as monopolistic agents, stressing the negative aspects of unions 
and the distortions they create compared to the perfect competition model. Within this framework, 
unions extract monopoly gains from the employers by constraining the labor supply. This translates 
into compensation above competitive levels for their members while potentially causing temporary 
negative productivity shocks. 
It is also possible that unions might impose the adoption of inefficient contractual work rules and 
generate reductions in managerial discretion that may increase the cost of reacting to economic shocks 
in dynamic economic environments (Hirsch, 2008).2 Furthermore, union rent-seeking behavior can 
further reduce long run productivity by imposing a pseudo “union tax” on capital returns, limiting the 
adoption of new technology and investment (Connolly, Hirsch, and Hirschey 1986; Hirsch 1991, 2004). 
Constraints in labor supply might also generate wage/price distortions that could force firms to 
shift toward suboptimal mix of inputs, possibly causing (small) deadweight welfare loss and lower 
overall labor productivity. These distortions might spuriously increase production per worker if firms 
shift their input mix toward higher capital intensity and/or higher skilled workers, without genera-
ting gains of technical efficiency. This is less likely to be observed to the extent that unions tax the 
quasi-rents from capital, reducing incentives to increase investment.3 Besides, although high union 
wages opens the possibility to employ workers with higher skills, such outcome is unlikely, given 
repeated bargaining (Wessels 1994; Hirsch 2004). 
The “collective voice/institutional response” face of unions, as described in Freeman and Medoff 
(1984), puts more emphasis on the positive aspects of unions and their potential roles enhancing 
operations and labor relationships within establishments. Legally protected unions can freely express 
their members’ preferences in the workplace, improving communication between employers and 
employees, inducing managers to alter methods of production and adopt more efficient personnel 
policies. In turn they can also reduce potential transaction costs associated with turnover, training 
and recruiting, monitoring and enforcement in the workplace (Kuhn 1985; Allen 1984). The presen-
ce of unionization and pressure for higher wages can increase productivity through shock effects, 
2 Although there is anecdotal evidence regarding inefficient union work rules, it seems unlikely that such inefficiencies would be long 
lived in markets with high levels of competition. There is no systematic evidence relating the interactions between union governance, 
dynamism, and productivity. 
3 For theory on unions and quasi-rents, see Grout (1984) and Baldwin (1983). For the earliest empirical test, see Connolly, Hirsch and 
Hirschey (1986). 
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reducing the so called “X-inefficiency” through improved operations which could have persisted in 
the absence of unions (Hirsch and Addison 1986; Addison and Hirsch 1989; Kaufman 2004). 
As Freeman and Medoff (1984) and Kuhn (1998) emphasize, the positive outcomes from the union’s 
collective voice are constrained to positive and cooperative relationship between management and 
organized labor. For instance, Kleiner (2002) finds that in the Aircraft industry, overall productivity 
was considerably lower during periods of conflicts between management and union leaders. While 
Black and Lynch (2001) and Bloom and Van Reenen (2011) find that negative union productivity 
effects are driven by unionized plants with traditional management systems, while positive effects 
are found among those (few) union establishments that adopt “best-method” human resources 
practices such as incentive pay.
1.2. Empirical evidence
As in other aspects of the literature on unions, the inherited endogeneity of the unionization process 
has made the identification of causal effects difficult (Lewis 1963; Freeman and Medoff 1984; Hirsch 
and Addison 1986; Hirsh 2004). The strategy in most studies has been to compare unionized versus 
nonunionized firms, using cross-section or panel data, to identify the impact that unions had on 
productivity and performance. More recent studies, using event study and regression discontinuity 
approaches, have been able to provide estimates closer to causal effects (DiNardo and Lee 2004; Lee 
and Mas 2012).
The seminal paper on unions and productivity by Brown and Medoff (1978) is one of the few 
studies finding a large and positive effect on productivity (22-24%). These results, however, were 
not supported by subsequent reviews of the literature, which attributed the results to serious data 
limitations (Freeman and Medoff 1984; Hirsch and Addison 1986; Hirsch 2004). The rough consensus 
on U.S. studies is that union productivity effects are, on average, small and non-significant and highly 
variable across different economic settings (Doucouliagos and Laroche 2003). When positive, they 
are too small to fully offset union wage effects, consistent with the findings of lower profitability 
among union companies (Fuchs, Krueger and Poterba 1998; Hirsch 2004; Doucouliagos and Laroche 
2009). Regression discontinuity analysis of DiNardo and Lee (2004) find unions have an insignificant 
effect on productivity or wages, although the even study of Lee and Mas (2012) find a negative effect 
on firm’s stock value. 
International evidence for other developed countries likewise finds unions have negative effects on 
profitability, but also that unions have mostly negative effects on productivity, except for industries 
with high competition or good relationships between management and unions (Aidt and Tzannatos 
2002; Doucouliagos and Laroche 2003). 
Beyond the scope of developed countries, the literature on the economic effects of unions is limited, 
and little is known about how unions affect productivity in developing countries. A brief summary 
of the relevant literature in developing Latin American countries is provided.4 
Fairris (2006) finds, for Mexico, that unions have a possitive effect on productivity, but not 
profitability, which is possibly attributed to higher training rates. Menezes-Filho, et al. (2005) finds 
that unions in the manufacturing sector in Brazil are correlated with lower levels of profitability and 
4 A more comprehensive review of the literature can be found in Freeman (2010)
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investment, but that some level of unionization could have a positive impact on productivity, parti-
cularly in larger in firms with profit sharing. 
Saavedra and Toledo (2005) finds evidence for Peru that union firms earn lower profits and have 
lower productivity, but that such effects are strongly related to the firm characteristics. The authors 
partially attribute this to conflicts between labor and management. Cassoni, et al. (2005) finds a 
positive effect on productivity and productivity growth in the manufacture sector in Uruguay, with 
mixed evidence regarding profitability. The authors argue that improvements in productivity might 
be explained by increased labor stability and lower turnover, and to a lesser extent improved coo-
peration and labor morale. Finally, Urizar and Lee (2005), studying coffee producers in Guatemala, 
find evidence that becoming unionized decreases productivity, although the estimates seem to be 
tied to firm characteristics.
2. UNIONS IN LATIN AMERICA: BACKGROUND
There is a substantial literature focused on the development of unions in Latin America, most of 
which has taken a historical and legal approach describing the evolution of the labor movements in 
these countries. This section provides a brief overview of important features in the development of 
unions and legal framework in Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Mexico, Panama and Uruguay.5  
2.1. History 
Most unions in Latin America have been characterized as playing strong roles in the political arena, 
both in opposition to and as supporters of the political parties in power (Carrière, Haworth and Rod-
dick 1989). The economic and political development of unions in Latin America is, to no small degree, 
a story of union alliances and unions strongly influenced by government. Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, 
Mexico, Panama and Uruguay are no exception.
The alliances between unions and the Peronist Party in Argentina and the Partido Revolucio-
nario Institucional (PRI) in Mexico became long-lasting relationships that benefited the unions for 
decades. In Bolivia and Chile, alliances between the government and unions were more fragile, with 
strong unions that played important roles as government allies and opposition. In Panama, during 
the government of Omar Torrijos (from 1968-1978), the president promoted reforms and encoura-
ged alliances to empower the formation of stronger and more active unions. In Uruguay, where little 
if any coordination existed between unions and the government, unions played a major role in the 
democratization process of the 1980s. While the strong alliances between unions and government 
became the pillar of unions’ bargaining power, they weaken their role as collective bargaining in the 
private sector O’Connell (1999).
The era of dictatorships in Latin America, between the 1970s and late 1980s, produced a major 
setback for unions. With the exception of Panama, unions were dissolved and persecuted. In Argentina, 
Bolivia and Mexico, where unions were declared illegal, they remained active opposing the dictatorship. 
In Chile, while unions were initially disbanded, but following the Plan Laboral (late 1970s), the right 
of association was reestablished, reforming the role of unions as a decentralized unit operating in a 
newly-adopted neoliberal economy. Finally, in Uruguay, the military regime outlawed union activity 
5 This overview does not pretend to be exhaustive. For a more comprehensive analyses see Alexander and Parker (2005), Anner 
(2008), Carrière, Haworth, and Roddick (1989), Cassoni, Allen, and Labadie (2004), Cassoni, et al., (2005), Hudson (1994), Hudson and 
Hanratty (1991), Hudson and Meditz (1992), Meditz and Hanratty (1989), Merrill and Miró (1997), Murillo (2000), Murillo and Schrank (2005), 
O’Connell (1999), OECD (1996) and Ulloa (2003). 
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and granted rights of dismissal to employers in case of strikes, producing massive layoffs. These 
actions effectively eliminated substantive union activities until early 1980s, when unions were allowed 
to resurface, with close control from the government to reduce the politicization of their activities.
With the return of democracy, unions resurfaced throughout the region. The debt crisis that 
affected Latin America in the 1980s, however, marked a change in the economic system for most of 
the countries in the region. In an attempt to overcome the crisis, many countries attempted a series 
of reforms moving from a centralized and protectionist market, to an open and more flexible market 
environment with smaller governments. These changes greatly reduced the leverage that unions 
had on government policies, forcing them to rely on their role in the private sector (O’Connell 1999). 
Although policies were implemented to favor more flexible labor markets, a series of union-friendly 
reforms were also adopted during the 1980s and 1990s (Murillo and Schrank 2005). Such reforms 
were insufficient to strengthen the role of unions as bargaining agents, fragmenting further an 
already weakened institution (Anner 2008). 
2.2. Legal Background
As described by Murillo (2000), Murillo and Schrank (2005), Anner (2008) and O’Connell (1999), the 
aftermath of the debt crisis, the return to democracy, economic reform and subsequent union friendly 
reforms transformed the role unions had in the labor market. Unions across the region had to adapt 
to a more flexible labor market, transitioning from a state-union to a firm-union relationship. The 
combination of legal responses, coupled with a union’s background, brought considerable heteroge-
neity in the way unions operated. Table 1 summarizes important characteristics that describe the 
conditions under which unions operate in selected countries.
Similar to the experience worldwide, Bolivia, Mexico and Panama have shown a decline in unioniza-
tion rates, while Argentina and Uruguay have shown a slight increase in unionization rates. According 
to Anner (2008), the market-oriented reforms weaken unions by eliminating protectionist policies, 
reducing the public sector, and contributing to the growth of informal labor.6 The union-friendly 
reforms were limited and unable to counteract the increasing employment flexibility, and were in-
capable of providing adequate protection and enforcement systems from anti-union discrimination. 
The bargaining system in Argentina, Bolivia and Mexico are characterized by substantial state 
intervention. In Argentina, while unions can be formed freely, only the union with the most members 
in a specific industry and/or area is recognized. In Bolivia and Mexico, unions can be formed freely, 
but need to be authorized by the Department of Labor to be recognized and engage with employers. 
In Chile and Panama, there is little intervention of the state on the formation of unions other than 
notification of the authorities. In Uruguay there are no formal regulations on the formation and ac-
tivities of unions. In most countries freedom of association is guaranteed for all workers except for 
public officials or government workers. 
6 This doesn’t imply that workers in the informal sector do not form other types of labor organizations similar to unions. Those 
organizations, also referred as unions, have characteristics that differ from the traditional role of unions, and are not considered in this 
research.
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Table 1. Descriptive Evidence on Unions and the Bargaining System
Argentina Bolivia Chile
GDP per capita 2006 (in US$) 5485.5 1230.5 8912.2
%manufacture 22.27 14.38 13.20
Union density
1990-1995 28.7 30.9 13.6
1995-2000 25.6 16.4 11.3
2000-2006 37.6 12.9 13.8
ILO conventions
C87:Freedom of association 1960 1965 1999
C98:Right to organize and 
Collective bargain
1956 1973 1999
Freedom of association • All workers except for 
Military personnel 
• All workers but public 
administration
• All workers but public 
administration
Restrictions • One union per industry 
and geographical area 
recognized.
• Most representative union 
is recognized
• One union per 
establishment.
• Needs government 
authorization.
• More than one union per 
establishment allowed
• Unions are automa-tically 
recognized
Union formation • Needs to represent at least 
20% of the workers
• At least 20 workers are 
needed for professional 
unions. And 50% for firm 
unions.
• Small firms (less than 50 
wrks) need 8 workers to 
form a union. Otherwise, 
at least 25 workers are 
needed.
Collective bargain • Allowed at regional, 
provincial or firm level
• Contracts need to be 
approved by the Ministry 
of Labor
• Allowed for Unions, 
Federations and 
Confederations.
• Firm level bargain is 
recognized.
• National level bargaining is 
voluntary. 
• Worker associations 
(nonunionized) can engage 
into collective bargaining.
Access to financial 
information
• Yes • No • No
Right to strike • Right to strike is 
recognized
• Only unions that are 
registered have the right 
to strike
• Right to strike is 
recognized. Requires 3/4 
support. 
• Strikes in public sector, 
general strikes and solidary 
strikes are illegal.
• Right to strike is 
recognized, except in public 
sector. Requires simple 
majority support.
Protection Adequate Inadequate Adequate
Notes: GDP per capita and Manufacture as % of GDP were obtained from the World Bank Indicators (2012). Union Density Information 
is obtained from Household surveys, Anner (2008), Hayter and Stoevska (2011), Cassoni, et al. (2005), and information from the OIT. 
Characteristics of the bargaining systems were obtained from the countries labor codes, O’Connell (1999), Anner (2008); Murillo and 
Schrank (2005), Ronconi (2012), Anner (2008b) and Murillo (2000).
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Table 1. Descriptive Evidence on Unions and the Bargaining System (continued)
Mexico Panama Uruguay
GDP per capita 2006 (in US$) 8830.8 5201.6 5907.3
%manufacture 18.7 7.1 17.0
Union density
1990-1995 22.4 14.2 17.3
1995-2000 21.0 11.0 14.7
2000-2006 16.4 12.0 19.0
ILO conventions
C87:Freedom of association 1950 1958 1954
C98:Right to organize and 
Collective bargain
Not recognized 1966 1954
Freedom of association
• No prior authorization is 
required to create a trade 
union. 
• All workers but public 
officials administration
• There exist few regulations 
on unions
Restrictions
• Unions require officially 
authorization. 
• More than one union per 
firm allowed, but only the 
most representative is 
recognized
• Only one union per 
establishment. 
• No noticeable restrictions
Union formation
• Unions need at least 20 
workers
• Unions require 40 
members.
• There are no minimum of 
requirements
Collective bargain
• Employers have the 
obligation to engage into 
collective bargaining with 
unions at request.
• Worker associations 
(nonunionized) can engage 
into collective bargaining.
• Collective bargaining 
usually at industry level. 
Access to financial 
information
• No • Yes • No
Right to strike
• Right to Strike recognized. 
Requires simple majority. 
• Strikes in the Public sector 
requires 2/3 support
• Right to Strike recognized 
in case of working 
conditions improvements. 
Requires simple majority.
• No noticeable restrictions
Protection Inadequate Mostly adequate Adequate
Notes: GDP per capita and Manufacture as % of GDP were obtained from the World Bank Indicators (2012). Union Density Information 
is obtained from Household surveys, Anner (2008), Hayter and Stoevska (2011), Cassoni, et al. (2005), and information from the OIT. 
Characteristics of the bargaining systems were obtained from the countries labor codes, O’Connell (1999), Anner (2008); Murillo and 
Schrank (2005), Ronconi (2012), Anner (2008b) and Murillo (2000).
The restrictions on minimum requirements for formation and nature of the bargaining relations-
hip also show significant heterogeneity. Uruguay, in absence of a legal framework, does not have 
restrictions on union formation. In contrast, Panama requires at least 40 workers to form a union, the 
strongest restriction in the sample. Argentina, Bolivia, and Mexico, have similar requirements, with 
more flexibility for smaller establishments in Chile.
The bargaining systems range from a highly centralized system in Argentina to a decentralized 
system in Chile. In Mexico, the system is highly centralized due to considerable coordination between 
unions and the state (O’Connell 1999). Uruguay, which historically had a centralized system, has 
slowly transition toward bargaining at the firm level (Cassoni, et al., 2005). Chile and Panama have 
decentralized system that also allows nonunion workers to collectively bargain. In Bolivia, while a mixed 
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bargaining system is allowed, collective bargaining at centralized levels is common. Only unions in 
Argentina and Panama have access to financial information before they engage in collective bargaining. 
According to an Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (1996) 
evaluation, and more recently the Annual Survey of Violations of Trade Union Rights (ITUC 2007), 
Argentina, Chile and Uruguay have an adequate system to protect unions, while Bolivia and Mexico 
are considered inadequate. In the case of Panama, except for the requirements to form unions, pro-
tection is deemed adequate except in export-processing zones. In terms of enforcement capacity, 
the information reported in Ronconi (2012), shows that in the 2000s, Bolivia and Mexico had the 
lowest enforcement capacity, while Chile, Panama and Uruguay, have by far the best enforcement 
capabilities in the region.
3. DATA AND IMPUTATION STRATEGY
The present analysis uses data from the Enterprise Survey (ES) 2006, concentrating on the manu-
facturing sector in six selected Latin American countries (Table 2).7 The Enterprise Survey provides 
a standardized establishment level data set, with a representative sample of establishments in the 
non-agricultural, private sector.8 The survey provides rich information that can be used to identify 
aspects of establishment performance, market competition, managerial characteristics and labor 
force structure, among other things. 
Table 2. Sample Size by Country and Eligibility
Economy Size Countries
Sample size 
(manufacture)
Eligible Complete
Small 
Bolivia 359 298 215
Panama 238 185 112
Uruguay 317 251 136
Middle 
Argentina 623 540 294
Chile 627 564 409
Large Mexico 1,113 974 802
All 3,277 2,812 1,968
Notes: Prepared from the information of the Enterprise Survey 2006: Eligibility is assessed on whether or not the observation reports 
information on Sales. Complete data refers to cases when all the basic information (sales, capital and labor) is available for analysis.
A limitation of the ES data is the relatively high non-response incidence regarding sensitive 
information.9 Table 2 presents a summary availability of information based on alternative criteria 
for data completeness. The minimum eligibility criteria is to restrict the data to establishments with 
no more than 500 permanent workers, reported total sales last year, and provided information on 
7 The six countries in this analysis were selected for having a large enough presence of unionized (and not unionized) establishments 
in the sample. Other countries in the region, for example, Ecuador, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Honduras, Paraguay and Peru, have less 
than 5% of the interviewed unionized establishments.
8 Details on the implementation and survey structure can be found in the implementation notes for the Latin America Enterprise 
Surveys Data Set, and the methodological notes found at http://www.enterprisesurveys.org/Methodology.
9 Missing information is coded as follows: the subject’s refusal to answer, they did not know the information asked or the question 
was not applicable for the establishment.
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unions.10 This reduces the sample by 14% (call this the “eligible sample”). The sample is reduced by 
40% when one requires establishments to have complete information on sales, union status, capital 
and production cost. 
Even though the analysis could be conducted by removing the incomplete cases, case-wise de-
letion provides valid inferences only if the share of deleted cases is small or if the data are missing 
completely at random (MCAR).11 If this is not the case, the inferences obtained from a complete set 
might be significantly biased. In this paper, a Multiple Imputation (MI) approach is used to account 
for the missing information. The imputation process is based on the assumption that all the missing 
information are “missing at random” (MAR) in the sense of Little and Rubin (2002). This implies that 
the process that characterizes missingness of the information is entirely explained by the observed 
information. Under this assumption, the approach uses available information to create multiple in-
dependent imputed samples for the unobserved data that can be independently analyzed and the 
results combined to provide a single MI result.
This procedure advantage over simple imputation approach is that MI introduces new information 
to the system, by using the empirical distribution of the missing variables. Because this strategy 
uses all available information, observations with partial missing information are still considered to 
characterize the missingness and imputation equations. The next section describes the specification 
and implementation details of the MI strategy used in the paper.12
3.1. Multiple imputation: Implementation
The working sample is restricted to establishments with complete information on labor, union status 
and sales variables. Establishments owned by the public sector (more than 50%) are excluded. To 
reduce the bias caused by new or large establishments, the sample is restricted to those with at least 
3 years of operation and at most 500 permanent workers. Finally, in order to avoid biases due to data 
errors and inconsistencies, some minor edits are implemented.13 This reduces the working sample 
from 3,277 to 2,812 enterprises across the 6 countries. 
For consistency, imputation models are kept constant across countries, except for the characteris-
tics of region and industry.14 The imputation model includes variables capturing market competition, 
establishment structure, infrastructure characteristics, investment, labor force characteristics, and 
level of unionization.15 Imputation models are estimated using weights to obtain results representative 
at the national level. Iterative chained equations (ICE) are used to obtain imputed values given the 
10 Only 98 observations in the sample correspond to establishments with more than 500 permanent workers. These observations 
are excluded because there are not enough observations to compare union and nonunion establishments. Some of estimations are 
sensitive to their inclusion in the sample.
11 In the nomenclature of Little and Rubin (2002), data are missing completely at random if the probability of being missing does not 
depend on any observed or unobserved data. A weaker condition is missing at random (MAR) or ignorable non-response, which means 
that the distributions for missing and non-missing observations are similar after conditioning on measurable covariates. 
12 Details on the MI process are explained in appendix A
13 In some instances, information such as wages, sales or costs are either too high or too low, to be consistent with other information 
within the establishment and other similar establishments (typos). Depending on each case, the values were inflated or deflated 
(reducing the excess of zeroes), or change the value to missing data.
14 The regions with major economic activity are selected for interviews in each region. The industry fixed effects correspond to the 
ISIC codes 15-37 (ISIC Rev.3.1). 
15 A complete list of the variables that are used in the imputation process can be found in the appendix C.
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observed data.16 While one cannot rule out the possibility that part of the information in the dataset is 
“missing not at random” (MNAR), i.e. missing is a function of unobserved characteristics, Graham, et 
al. (1997) shows that the sensitivity to unobserved factors is frequently small, and that even under such 
circumstances, the MI approach provides better inferences than working with complete reported data. 
Table 3. Multiple Imputation Summary
Variable Method Complete Imputed % Imputed Total
Nr of workers in t-1 PMM 2623 189 6.7% 2812
Cost of labor as % of sales PMM 2563 249 8.9% 2812
Cost of electricity as % of sales PMM 2572 240 8.5% 2812
Cost of communications as % of sales PMM 2570 242 8.6% 2812
Cost of materials and inputs as % of sales PMM 2479 333 11.8% 2812
Cost of fuel as % of sales PMM 2441 371 13.2% 2812
Cost of transportation as % of sales PMM 2460 352 12.5% 2812
Cost of water as % of sales PMM 2408 404 14.4% 2812
Cost of rentals as % of sales PMM 2453 359 12.8% 2812
Log Nr of workers in t-1 OLS 2623 189 6.7% 2812
Log sales in t-1 OLS 2288 524 18.6% 2812
Log wages production workers OLS 2721 91 3.2% 2812
Log wages non production workers OLS 2589 223 7.9% 2812
Log capital (book value) OLS 1961 851 30.3% 2812
Log capital (market value) OLS 2346 466 16.6% 2812
Log materials and Inputs OLS 2441 371 13.2% 2812
Log salaries OLS 2574 238 8.5% 2812
Note: the complete set of the variables and imputations are shown in appendix C. OLS imputation uses linear predictions to obtain the 
imputed values. PMM is a predictive mean matching algorithm that uses the value of the closest observation (using predicted means) 
to impute missing information.
Table 3 presents a summary of the imputations for the most important variables in the study. As 
one can observe, information regarding capital, a fundamental variable in the analysis, has one of the 
largest incidences of missing information (30.3% book value of capital and 16.6% market value). Among 
production costs, the costs of electricity and communication have the lowest missing rates (8.5% and 
8.6%), while costs of fuel and water have the highest rates of missing information (13.2% and 14.4%).
3.2. Summary Statistics
Table 4 presents the summary statistics of the combined imputed samples. Most countries’ establi-
shment unionization rates are between 20-30%.17 The exceptions are Bolivia, with the lowest shares 
of unionized establishments (13.4% or 7.0% weighted), and Argentina, with more than 90% of esta-
blishments being unionized. Unionized establishments are larger (in terms of number of workers) 
and operate for longer hours per week. With the exception of Chile, unionized establishments show a 
more intensive use of their installed capital. Both hours of operation and use of capital are positively 
correlated to the capital intensity. 
16 While the literature recommends 5-10 imputed samples to obtain appropriate inferences (Rubin 1987), 50 imputed samples are 
obtained for the analysis in order to obtain stable results (Horton and Lipsitz 2001). Following the literature, 20 iterations are used for 
the burn-in period to achieve convergence on the system (van Buuren 2007).
17 An establishment is classified as unionized if any share of their workforce is considered to be part of a union.
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Except for Argentina, unionized establishments have higher levels of sales per capita than their coun-
terparts, and, with the exception of Argentina and Mexico, unionized establishments have higher levels 
of capital intensity.18 Unionized establishments are on average older.19 With the exception of Argentina, 
companies owned by foreign capital are more likely to be unionized, but establishments with a single ma-
jority shareholder are less likely to be unionized. In all countries but Panama, unionized establishments are 
more likely to have some type of certification for production quality. Similarly, unionized establishments 
invest more in physical capital, and research and development. In terms of workforce characteristics, 
unionized establishments are more likely to have an ongoing training program, with larger shares of the 
workforce trained. Apart from Chile, unionized establishments have larger shares of production workers. 
Table 4. Summary Statistics
Argentina Bolivia Chile
Nonunion Union Nonunion Union Nonunion Union
Nr of establishments 46 494 258 40 415 149
Share 8.5 91.5 86.6 13.4 73.6 26.4
Share weighted 11.0 89.0 93.0 7.0 71.9 28.1
Union density (% unionized) 68.50% 5.80% 13.00%
Log sales per capita 10.58 10.46 8.79 9.66 10.41 10.77
Nr of equivalent permanent workers 22.73 58.27 28.07 143.03 40.69 115.24
Log capital (market value) per worker 9.13 8.99 7.75 8.83 8.84 9.22
Cost of labor as share of sales 19.1% 24.3% 23.1% 19.9% 24.7% 21.9%
Cost of inputs as share of sales 37.3% 42.7% 39.0% 37.1% 42.5% 42.1%
% Level of utilization of facilities 66.6% 70.2% 62.5% 63.7% 72.3% 68.5%
Avg hrs. of operation per Week 70.03 62.33 59.12 82.05 64.23 81.51
%Sales coming from manufacture 93.5% 93.4% 97.4% 98.7% 95.1% 98.1%
%Sales subcontracted 17.4% 8.7% 12.1% 13.5% 6.9% 4.9%
Age of establishment 25.01 35.19 21.76 29.60 25.94 41.30
Exp. top manager 30.39 27.65 21.15 19.73 26.53 24.14
Owned by foreign capital 5.5% 5.0% 3.9% 28.7% 2.1% 7.1%
>50% own by largest shareholder 93.8% 75.2% 84.8% 65.2% 90.1% 80.6%
Quality certification 16.5% 24.8% 8.6% 38.4% 19.8% 37.1%
New production or process 79.4% 80.1% 83.7% 93.7% 78.3% 74.9%
Investment in R&D or capital 75.2% 75.4% 62.0% 79.4% 77.9% 82.6%
% with no training program 72.4% 47.3% 42.2% 30.8% 60.7% 41.4%
% with 1-33% trained wf 0.9% 13.5% 20.6% 11.1% 21.0% 20.4%
% with 34-66% trained wf 0.2% 8.6% 17.0% 22.3% 8.2% 17.8%
% with 67-100% trained wf 26.5% 30.5% 20.1% 35.7% 10.1% 20.5%
Share prod Workers 63.2% 73.7% 65.0% 72.3% 70.7% 65.8%
Share skill Workers 53.6% 55.7% 68.6% 61.2% 54.7% 64.1%
% with 7+ yrs avg worker education 99.7% 97.6% 81.6% 70.0% 98.5% 94.0%
Share temporary workersa 10.5% 5.6% 28.3% 14.9% 9.0% 5.8%
Note: The averages are calculated using survey weights and all imputed data.a The Share of temporary workers is defined as number 
of total temporary workers divided by total number of permanent and temporary workers.
18 Per capita measures are calculated dividing the variables of interest by the total number of permanent workers plus equivalent 
temporary workers in the establishment. Capital per capita is calculated using the hypothetical or “market value” of capital. It is the 
establishment estimation of fair value of their machinery.
19 There is no information available on when unions formed within the establishment.
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Table 4. Summary Statistics (Continued)
Mexico Panama Uruguay
Nonunion Union Nonunion Union Nonunion Union
Nr of Establishments 639 335 148 37 181 70
Share 65.6 34.4 80.0 20.0 72.1 27.9
Share weighted 72.6 27.4 78.9 21.1 79.4 20.6
Union Density (% unionized)  21.00%  12.30%  10.80%
Log sales per capita 9.69 9.95 10.15 10.53 9.94 10.30
Nr of equivalent permanent workers 24.72 69.59 32.94 80.79 21.90 45.88
Log capital (market value) per worker 8.31 8.27 8.90 10.36 8.64 8.91
Cost of labor as share of sales 25.6% 24.5% 20.8% 23.5% 21.3% 19.0%
Cost of inputs as share of sales 26.9% 26.7% 34.3% 39.9% 47.4% 46.4%
% Level of utilization of facilities 73.9% 73.8% 71.8% 79.6% 65.9% 64.9%
Avg hrs. of operation per Week 60.69 67.45 55.81 67.79 70.35 88.36
%Sales coming from manufacture 96.4% 99.0% 93.4% 91.0% 96.8% 96.5%
%Sales subcontracted 8.5% 13.2% 5.6% 10.1% 9.4% 8.0%
Age of establishment 17.61 22.71 23.30 35.52 27.41 33.70
Exp. top manager 16.90 19.02 22.08 26.14 25.29 26.70
Owned by foreign capital 1.6% 6.6% 8.0% 9.2% 2.7% 13.1%
>50% own by largest shareholder 84.5% 73.2% 89.2% 76.4% 82.7% 64.6%
Quality certification 9.8% 25.9% 11.2% 7.7% 6.6% 14.5%
New production or process 26.3% 57.0% 73.8% 65.9% 70.9% 82.0%
Investment in R&D or capital 22.6% 48.9% 63.9% 78.8% 56.0% 64.6%
% with no training program 87.2% 49.5% 58.3% 38.9% 76.8% 47.5%
% with 1-33% trained wf 1.9% 5.1% 15.2% 14.6% 10.1% 24.7%
% with 34-66% trained wf 4.4% 14.3% 10.7% 23.7% 4.9% 6.7%
% with 67-100% trained wf 6.5% 31.2% 15.7% 22.8% 8.3% 21.1%
Share prod Workers 72.8% 74.4% 66.2% 71.1% 72.8% 74.0%
Share skill Workers 85.3% 78.1% 74.4% 78.7% 56.4% 57.7%
% with 7+ yrs avg worker education 13.3% 10.6% 94.8% 93.7% 64.9% 58.2%
Share temporary workersa 4.1% 6.0% 16.6% 18.9% 7.8% 7.0%
Note: The averages are calculated using survey weights and all imputed data.a The share of temporary workers is defined as number 
of total temporary workers divided by total number of permanent and temporary workers.
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4. ECONOMETRIC STRATEGY
To determine the effects of unions on productivity, the starting point is the model developed by 
Brown and Medoff (1978). This is a variant of a Cobb-Douglas production function that distingui-
shes between two types of workers (nonunion and union). Assuming constant returns to scale, the 
production function can be written as follows:
(1)
where Q is a measure of output or productivity, K is the level of capital, Ln and Lu are nonunion 
and union workers respectively, all measured at the establishment level i; A is the constant of pro-
portionality that depends on the measurement units of capital, labor and output, and accounts for 
other characteristics that determine productivity; and “a” and “1-a” are the output elasticities with 
respect to capital and labor, assuming constant returns to scale. In this framework, “c” reflects the 
productivity differences between union and nonunion labor. After some manipulation, equation (1) 
can be linearized and written as:
(2)
where q=   and k=   are measures of labor productivity and capital per capita, P=   is the share 
of unionized workers in the establishment, and L is total number of workers in the establishment. 
Here δ  represents the overall impact that unions have on establishment labor productivity, once we 
control for capital intensity.
Because equation (2) is rather restrictive a more flexible specification is used, following a gene-
ral form of a translog specification for the production function (Christensen, Jorgenson, and Lau, 
1973). After including an error term, and additional controls for productivity, the specification to be 
estimated can be written as follows:
(3)
Although similar specifications have been widely used in the literature, there are limitations that 
need to be discussed (for details on the discussion see Brown and Medoff 1978 and Hirsch and Addison 
1986). First, while physical production is preferable, in its absence, this paper uses value added.20 The 
potential problem is that this measure might confound effects of both prices and quantity changes, as 
firms might shift some of the increasing cost (wages) to the consumers. Following Hirsch (2004), this 
problem is mitigated by controlling for industry fixed effects and measures of market competition.
A second problem is that the specification assumes union and nonunion establishments share 
the same production function, except for the productivity parameter associated to unions. Although 
this problem could be alleviated by introducing different set of interactions, it may require more 
information than what is available. In addition, the flexibility obtained using a translog production 
function (equation 3) should help reduce the severity of the problem. 
The most vexing problem is the potential endogeneity of establishment unionization. According 
to Clark (1984), one might not expect unionization and sales to be simultaneously determined, since 
unionization should have happened long before the survey interview. Concerns with respect to the 
20 Value added is defined as annual sales minus production costs on materials, electricity and water, divided by total labor force.
Qi= Ai Ki
a (Li,n + cLi,u ) 
1-a
log qi = logA + a * log ki + δ * Pi
log q = a0+ a1 * log k + a2 * log L + a3 log K
2 + a4 log L
2 + a5 log K log L + δ P + X' β + e
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inter-temporal effects of unionization remain. If union negatively affects profits, businesses will be 
less likely to survive. This survivor bias should lead to overstate union productivity effects since 
businesses with detrimental union effects on performance are least likely to remain in the sample 
(Addison and Hirsch 1989). Further, omitted variables in the specification can also generate incon-
sistent estimates if the unobserved characteristics have systematic variations between union and 
nonunion establishments. 
Taking advantage of the rich information contained in the survey, the preferred specifications 
controls for different characteristics such as age of the establishment, manager experience and 
ownership characteristics, among others, that provides a flexible specification, reducing the impact 
of otherwise unmeasured characteristics. Nevertheless, because of potential survivor bias and 
the presence of additional unobserved factors, the estimations could be upward biased, should be 
considered with care, and should not be interpreted as causal effects. To test the sensitivity of the 
productivity estimates to the controls, different specifications are used to control for aspects related to 
market competition, establishment characteristics and organization, and innovation policies. Though 
the estimates here presented are “descriptive” in nature, the evidence is informative, as they are the 
first step toward identifying how unions affect productivity in developing countries.
5. RESULTS 
Following the specification shown in equation (3), the natural logarithm of value added per worker is 
used as the productivity measure. For observations where production costs exceed the value of total 
sales, total cost is constrained and the cases controlled using a dummy variable.21 For the production 
factors, employment is measured as the total number of permanent workers plus the equivalent 
number of seasonal workers, while capital is measured as log of the market value of machinery and 
equipment (including vehicles).22 In addition, the basic model includes controls for region and broad 
industry fixed effects. The main variable of interest, union density, is included as a share between 
0 and 1, which indicates what share of the permanent labor force in the establishment is unionized. 
Table 5. Effect of Unions on Establishment Productivity, by Country
 Argentina Bolivia Chile Mexico Panama Uruguay
Avg. % unionization in union establishments 77.0% 82.5% 46.2% 76.8% 58.2% 52.2%
%Workforce unionized -0.389+ 0.160 0.167 0.095 0.256 0.178
(0.026) (0.695) (0.353) (0.555) (0.467) (0.448)
Log capital pc -0.777 0.316 -0.45 -0.086 -0.248 -0.114
 (0.306)  (0.421)  (0.194)  (0.650)  (0.490)  (0.717)
Log total labor force -0.427 -0.792 -0.443 0.19 0.045 0.522
(0.425) (0.150) (0.357) (0.548) (0.951) (0.549)
Log K log L -0.012 0.161* -0.005 -0.015 -0.001 -0.034
(0.878) (0.004) (0.914) (0.595) (0.986) (0.520)
Log K2 0.033 -0.027 0.027 0.017 0.012 0.008
(0.380) (0.250) (0.122) (0.115) (0.546) (0.606)
21 Overall, only 1.3% of the observations fall within these characteristics.
22 Equivalent seasonal workers are measured as the total number of temporary workers multiplied by the average time a temporal 
worker participates in the establishment in a year. As described in the survey manual, information collected on the market value 
(hypothetical value) of capital is recommended to be used as the best approximation for capital intensity in the establishment.
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 Argentina Bolivia Chile Mexico Panama Uruguay
Log L2 -0.001 -0.124 0.000 -0.031 -0.031 0.029
(0.983) (0.162) (0.998) (0.395) (0.646) (0.813)
Constant 13.648* 6.917* 11.143* 7.987* 10.390* 8.291*
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
δV Apc / δK , at means -0.006 0.207 0.203 0.250 0.043 -0.026
δV Apc / δL , at means 0.196 -0.104 -0.055 -0.068 0.093 0.409
Observations 540 298 564 974 185 251
Note: ^ p<0.1, + p<0.05, * p<0.01. P-values in parentheses. All models are estimated using sample weights. All models include region 
and broad industry fixed effects.
Table 5 presents the results of the basic specification which controls only for production factors, 
and region and industry fixed effects. These basic results show that for most countries in our sam-
ple, unions have a positive but weak correlation with productivity. In the absence of endogeneity, 
the point estimates indicate that, on average, if a nonunion establishment unionizes it could increa-
se productivity per worker between 0.077 log points (approximately 8%) to up to 0.149 log points 
(15%).23 Although the point estimates are sizable, the results also indicate that there is considerably 
heterogeneity across establishments, shown by the low significance levels of the parameters. The 
only exception is Argentina; the estimate shows that unions have a large negative and significant 
impact on productivity (-0.389*77%=0.299 log points). It should be kept in mind that in contrast to 
other countries in the sample, most of Argentina’s manufacture establishments are unionized.
Given the type of production function used here, the coefficients for capital and labor are more 
difficult to interpret than in the standard Brown and Medoff model. To facilitate interpretation, at 
the bottom of Table 5, the derivatives with respect to labor and capital are obtained and evaluated 
at the mean.24 The parameters are consistent with the expectations for Bolivia, Chile and Mexico. In 
Argentina, Panama and Uruguay, however, the estimates are somewhat unexpected as the marginal 
effect of capital is almost zero, with a positive marginal effect from labor. Although these results are 
worrisome, they remain consistent across different specification, and should not to be crucial for the 
main focus of the analysis. 
5.1. Sensitivity to Additional Controls
The basic model estimated in Table 5 does not take into account other characteristics that can explain 
productivity or that can differ between unionized or nonunionized establishments. Tables 6 and 7 
present estimations using richer specifications. Table 6 presents results of the union productivity 
effect only, to show how sensitive the estimates are to additional controls, while Table 7 presents the 
results of the full specification model.
Controlling for the level of competition should improve the estimates by partially accounting for 
differences in prices caused by union effects on labor costs. The second row of in Table 6 provides 
the estimates after controlling the number of competitors the in the market. In Chile and Uruguay, 
the productivity estimates are greatly reduced, with the estimates for Uruguay becoming negative. 
23 The average marginal effect is obtained by multiplying the union coefficient estimate by the average unionization rate among union 
establishments (i.e. Marginal effect in Bolivia: 82.5%*0.16=0.132 log points).
24 The estimates of the basic specification using the basic Brown and Medoff (1978) model are shown in appendix C. The results 
are comparable to the estimations of Table 5, except for Bolivia, where the Brown and Medoff basic model predicts a much larger 
productivity relationship.
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In Chile, these results seem to be driven by the impact that some competition (2-5 competitors in 
the market) has on sales and productivity (see Table 7). In Uruguay, while partial model (not shown 
here) suggests a story similar to Chile, after controlling for other factors, competition seems to have 
a small and not significant impact on productivity. 
An implicit assumption in the model is that all sales (production) come from the establishment’s own 
manufactured goods produced using full capacity of the available resources. Longer hours of operation 
or greater use of production capacity can spuriously increase productivity estimates if they are not 
controlled for. Likewise, if establishments subcontract production to smaller units, or generate sales 
via services (rather than manufacture), it may bias the productivity estimates. Results in Table 7 show 
the results controlling for level of utilization of capital, weekly hours of operation, and sales structure 
(services and subcontracts). Controlling for these productivity adjustments suggests that union pro-
ductivity enhancements are not coming from more intensive use of production factors, showing larger 
estimates increase for all countries. Chile and Uruguay show the most drastic changes on productivity, 
with modest changes elsewhere. The results in Table 7 show that the parameters for these controls are 
consistent with the expected signs.
Other factors correlated with union status and productivity are linked to establishment characte-
ristics and management quality. To account for establishment characteristics, variables controlling 
for years of operation, whether the establishment is part of a larger firm, and if it the establishment 
is owned by foreign capital are included in the specification. Controlling for these factors reduces 
the productivity relationship in Bolivia, and increases it in Chile to almost significant levels (p=12.5%). 
According to the results in Table 7, the fall in the union-productivity relationship in Bolivia is exp-
lained because most of the positive relationship was driven by foreign owned companies, which are 
typically unionized. This is consistent with the fact that being part of a larger firm and being owned 
by foreign capital is correlated with better managerial policies (Aitken, et al. 1996). Alternatively, in 
Chile, not accounting for younger establishments, which are more productive and less likely to be 
unionized, was understating union productivity effects.
To control for management quality and organization, variables describing the ownership structure 
and management characteristics are included in the specification. Argentina and Panama show the lar-
gest positive change in the estimates of the union-productivity relationship. These results suggest that 
unionized establishments have relatively more inefficient management, which puts downward pressure 
on productivity if management characteristics are not accounted for. The results in Table 7 suggest 
that the strong relationship between productivity and decision strength of the largest shareholder is 
the main factor explaining the impact on the union-productivity estimates in Panama. 
Although some of the previous controls are arguably not directly affected by unions, aspects 
such as investment, training, and workforce structure could be affected their presence. In the in-
terest of disentangling the direct effect unions on productivity, additional controls are introduced 
in the specification. Under the assumption that unions have a negative impact on investment (rent 
seeking behavior), controlling for investment should have a positive impact on the union-productivity 
relationship. The results on Table 6, however, indicate that controlling for investment and innovation 
have little impact on the union estimates. 
Because unions are often associated with lower turnover, unionized establishments might be 
more likely to provide more training, since they can benefit from the returns of such investment 
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through higher productivity (Kuhn 1985; Allen 1984). Although human capital upgrades are legi-
timate sources of productivity enhancements, they may not necessary generate improvements in 
technical efficiency. Including training as a control variable in the estimations see Table 7) shows 
that, on average, training has a positive, mostly not significant, impact on productivity. Adding these 
controls to the specification has the expected negative effect on the union-productivity relationship 
for all countries, especially for Panama, indicating that training is an important channel through 
which unions improve productivity. 
Unions can also influence the structure and composition of the workforce within establishment, 
changing the mix of production factors and affecting productivity. The last estimates in Table 6 
control for two aspects of workforce characteristics: workers’ average education and workforce 
structure. Except for Chile and Panama, controlling for these effects increases the impact of unions 
on productivity. In Bolivia, Mexico and Uruguay, similar to the evidence at the micro level (Rios-Avila 
and Hirsch, forthcoming), unionized establishments are associated with low-educated, low-skill 
workers, and not controlling for it understates productivity. The evidence, however, is insufficient 
to detect the effect of other workforce characteristics on union-productivity effect.
Although there is limited evidence on the productivity effects of unions for these countries in 
the literature, the evidence that does exist appears consistent with the results found here. Using 
information from a national survey of manufacturing in Mexico in 1999, Fairris (2006) finds that 
unionized establishments are about 11% more productive than their counterparts (compared to the 
9% estimate here). In the case of Uruguay, Cassoni, et al. (2005) finds a modest 5.7% effect, quali-
tatively similar to the 12% (0.12 log points) found here. These similarities increase the confidence in 
the results shown in Table 6.
Table 6. Effect of Unions on Establishment (Est.) Productivity, Sensitivity to 
Specifications
 Argentina Bolivia Chile Mexico Panama Uruguay
%Workforce unionized -0.389+ 0.160 0.167 0.095 0.256 0.178
Basic model  (0.026)  (0.695)  (0.353)  (0.555)  (0.467)  (0.448)
%Workforce unionized -0.388^ 0.190 0.038 0.114 0.286 -0.083
+Competition  (0.054)  (0.662)  (0.832)  (0.447)  (0.401)  (0.763)
%Workforce unionized -0.328+ 0.232 0.156 0.145 0.280 0.117
+Productivity adjustments  (0.028)  (0.609)  (0.316)  (0.382)  (0.419)  (0.578)
%Workforce unionized -0.322+ -0.013 0.251 0.101 0.305 0.072
+Est. characteristics and ownership  (0.034)  (0.976)  (0.125)  (0.535)  (0.393)  (0.755)
%Workforce unionized -0.264^ -0.034 0.219 0.073 0.407 0.114
+ Management and organization  (0.058)  (0.930)  (0.170)  (0.620)  (0.242)  (0.570)
%Workforce unionized -0.273^ -0.05 0.254 0.049 0.461 0.092
+Investment policy and technology  (0.090)  (0.891)  (0.117)  (0.732)  (0.178)  (0.683)
%Workforce unionized -0.279^ -0.101 0.251 0.026 0.378 0.073
+Training  (0.097)  (0.797)  (0.118)  (0.863)  (0.272)  (0.787)
%Workforce unionized -0.257+ -0.009 0.173 0.093 0.349 0.117
+Labor force structure  (0.049)  (0.981)  (0.281)  (0.539)  (0.295)  (0.558)
Observations 540 298 564 974 185 251
Note: ^ p<0.1, + p<0.05, * p<0.01. P-values in parentheses. All models are calculated using all controls specified in the previous model. 
All models are estimated using the sample weights, and include region and broad industry fixed effects.
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Table 7. Effect of Unions on Establishment (Est.) Productivity, Full Specification
 Argentina Bolivia Chile Mexico Panama Uruguay
%Workforce unionized -0.257+ -0.009 0.173 0.093 0.349 0.117
 (0.049)  (0.981)  (0.281)  (0.539)  (0.295)  (0.558)
Competition
Establishment has 2-5 competitors 0.044 -0.342 0.443+ -0.359* -0.009 -0.425
 (0.850)  (0.331)  (0.013)  (0.002)  (0.970)  (0.268)
Establishment has 5 or more -0.105 -0.209 0.154 -0.287+ 0.138 -0.368
competitors  (0.718)  (0.509)  (0.323)  (0.016)  (0.645)  (0.217)
Establishment faces international -0.047 -0.206 0.029 0.341 0.127 0.046
market  (0.822)  (0.510)  (0.908)  (0.261)  (0.765)  (0.876)
Capacity and Utilization
Level of utilization of capital 0.008* 0.006^ 0.002 0.002 -0.001 0.016*
 (0.004)  (0.060)  (0.236)  (0.210)  (0.890)  (0.003)
Log hours of operation per week -0.245 0.148 -0.128 0.062 0.152 -0.239^
 (0.230)  (0.454)  (0.165)  (0.643)  (0.569)  (0.086)
%Sales not from manufacture -0.014 1.203 0.927+ 0.796 1.326^ -1.012
 (0.972)  (0.288)  (0.041)  (0.240)  (0.058)  (0.418)
%Sales that are subcontracted -0.246 0.275 0.190 0.116 0.206 -0.430
 (0.224)  (0.408)  (0.357)  (0.619)  (0.614)  (0.201)
Est. Characteristics
Owned by foreign capital (>50%) 0.227 0.727+ 0.239 -0.117 0.335 0.182
 (0.472)  (0.013)  (0.274)  (0.540)  (0.280)  (0.734)
Establishment part of larger firm 0.150 -0.311 0.073 0.084 0.107 0.220
 (0.343)  (0.307)  (0.541)  (0.440)  (0.750)  (0.620)
Age of the establishment 0.009 0.028 -0.010 0.027* 0.002 0.006
(Years of operation)  (0.236)  (0.107)  (0.111)  (0.000)  (0.896)  (0.524)
Age2/100 -0.006 -0.009 0.007 -0.029* -0.007 -0.0004
 (0.101)  (0.587)  (0.173)  (0.000)  (0.711)  (0.960)
Management and Organization
>50% own by largest shareholder 0.128 -0.234 0.031 -0.036 0.541^ -0.034
 (0.439)  (0.378)  (0.751)  (0.653)  (0.051)  (0.845)
Any of the main owners female -0.043 -0.331^ 0.052 -0.214* 0.366^ -0.264
 (0.683)  (0.066)  (0.615)  (0.004)  (0.071)  (0.223)
Experience top manager 0.018 0.028^ 0.007 0.000 -0.039 -0.009
 (0.254)  (0.069)  (0.456)  (0.982)  (0.253)  (0.780)
Experience2/100 -0.042+ -0.097* -0.023 -0.005 0.076 -0.002
 (0.013)  (0.010)  (0.170)  (0.760)  (0.246)  (0.965)
Public or private -0.057 0.303 0.150 0.173^ 0.283 0.311
Share holding company=1  (0.686)  (0.280)  (0.160)  (0.080)  (0.263)  (0.138)
Investment and Innovation
Uses foreign company technology 0.312+ -0.064 0.162 0.180 0.422 0.005
 (0.044)  (0.829)  (0.255)  (0.308)  (0.233)  (0.989)
Product quality certification 0.027 0.165 0.150 0.356* 0.514 0.567+
 (0.877)  (0.578)  (0.114)  (0.001)  (0.110)  (0.022)
Introduced new process or product 0.366+ -0.409+ 0.211+ 0.055 0.130 0.137
 (0.018)  (0.028)  (0.036)  (0.510)  (0.545)  (0.436)
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 Argentina Bolivia Chile Mexico Panama Uruguay
Invested in capital or R&D 0.144 0.053 -0.027 0.156^ -0.003 -0.038
 (0.216)  (0.755)  (0.821)  (0.088)  (0.989)  (0.811)
Training
1-33% workforce trained -0.006 -0.275 0.070 0.137 0.472 0.201
 (0.982)  (0.308)  (0.519)  (0.471)  (0.123)  (0.472)
34-66% workforce trained 0.588* -0.249 0.191 -0.008 0.043 0.322
 (0.001)  (0.284)  (0.293)  (0.960)  (0.873)  (0.409)
67-100% workforce trained 0.200 -0.219 0.121 0.067 -0.174 -0.280
 (0.127)  (0.109)  (0.375)  (0.597)  (0.543)  (0.143)
LF characteristics
Avg education 4-6 yrs 0.174 0.167^
 (0.631)  (0.094)
Avg education 7-12 yrs 0.126 0.365+ 0.341
 (0.614)  (0.045)  (0.169)
Avg education 13+ yrs -0.088 0.006 0.055 -0.271
 (0.385)  (0.984)  (0.689)  (0.199)
Share of production workers -0.882+ -0.448 -0.179 -0.291 0.377 -1.518*
 (0.016)  (0.161)  (0.632)  (0.261)  (0.503)  (0.000)
Share of skill workers -0.088 -0.148 0.098 0.340+ -0.146 -0.118
 (0.461)  (0.536)  (0.449)  (0.022)  (0.675)  (0.604)
Share of temporary workers 0.868 -0.843+ -0.499 -1.240 -0.257 -0.831
 (0.419)  (0.017)  (0.335)  (0.119)  (0.826)  (0.477)
Share of female workers -0.670+ -0.601+ -0.483+ 0.182 0.090 -0.313
 (0.037)  (0.020)  (0.035)  (0.320)  (0.796)  (0.569)
Constant 13.614* 7.422* 11.527* 7.361* 7.495* 10.519*
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.000)
Observations 540 298 564 974 185 251
Note: ^ p<0.1, + p<0.05, * p<0.01. P-values in parentheses. The base categories for competition are those establishments facing none 
or 1 other establishment in the market. For training, the base category corresponds to establishments with no training programs. 
For education, the base category corresponds to workers with 3 or fewer years of education for Bolivia and Mexico, 7 to 12 years for 
Argentina, Chile and Panama, and 4-6 years of education for Uruguay. All models are estimated using sample weights, and include 
region and broad industry fixed effects.
5.2. Interpretation
Taken as a whole, the results shown in Table 6 suggest that unions are associated with positive 
union-productivity effects, but that there is a lot of heterogeneity in the relationship both within and 
across countries (the former seen by the low significance levels of results). The results also provide 
some evidence that the union-productivity estimates are reasonably robust in richer specifications 
that take into account typically unobserved establishment characteristics. On one end of the spec-
trum, using the preferred specification (all controls), it can be observed that unions in Bolivia have no 
effect on productivity (practically zero), while a negative and significant estimate is seen in Argen-
tina (-0.284). On the other side, large positive, albeit insignificant, effects are observed in Chile and 
Panama, while estimates for Mexico and Uruguay are positive and consistent across specifications, 
but not significant.
The evidence presented in Table 6 also brings some light on determinants of the union-produc-
tivity relationship. Controlling for productivity adjustments increases union productivity estimates. 
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This suggests unions might be improving technical efficiency, adjusting for differences in sales and 
production structures across establishments, consistent with the reduction of “X-inefficiencies” (Hir-
sch and Addison 1986; Addison and Hirsch 1989; Kaufman, 2004). Part of the positive productivity 
effects, however, seem to be related to large unionization rates across large establishments, foreign 
owned, with typically better management. Consistent with the hypothesis in Fairris (2006), unions 
seem to be improving productivity by improving job training. Finally, lower levels of worker human 
capital seem to have contributed to an understatement of the productivity effects of unions.
Taken at face value, the estimate found for Argentina indicates that output per worker in a fully 
unionized establishment is 25 log points lower than in an equivalent nonunion establishment. Were 
we to have obtained such a result in other countries, it would have raised the question how union 
establishments could survive given lower productivity and (presumably) higher compensation. 
Argentina, however, is a special case compared to other countries in the region. There are very few 
establishments in the sample that are not unionized, and those nonunionized are rather different 
(relatively younger and smaller). 
As Kuhn (1998) and others have argued, negative productivity effects have been typically found 
in environments of union and management conflict, which might explain the results observed in 
Argentina. In Table 8, two aspects of labor regulations and the perception of management are pre-
sented. About 44% of establishments in Argentina consider that labor regulations are serious or very 
serious obstacles to the operation of the establishment. Similarly, 60% of establishments declare that 
labor regulations have affected their hiring and firing decisions, which is almost twice as high as in 
other countries.25 
Table 8. Perception of Labor Regulations
 Argentina Bolivia Chile Mexico Panama Uruguay
Labor regulations and H/F decisions
Hire decision affected 8.4 2.2 5.4 0.7 4.3 13.6
Fire decision affected 7.2 3.3 12.6 1.9 6.9 2.1
Hire and Fire affected 44.5 9.3 19.4 3.5 6.1 17.3
Labor regulation as obstacles
No obstacle 8.1 52.3 29.8 49.6 56.8 38.7
Minor obstacle 12.6 13.8 24.0 25.4 15.9 9.1
Moderate obstacle 34.4 20.2 26.2 19.1 18.8 30.4
Serious obstacle 26.9 7.5 15.6 3.8 7.5 14.0
Very serious obstacle 17.9 3.7 4.4 0.7 0.7 7.0
Note: All information reflects the weighted share of establishments within each category for each country.
To assess the extent that perceptions of labor regulations affect the union-productivity relationship, 
Table 9 presents two alternative specifications that show the interaction between unionization rates 
and the perception of regulations. The direction of the estimates suggests unions have a smaller (or 
larger and negative) effect on productivity in cases of negative perception of labor regulation. For 
instance, except for Mexico or Uruguay, the union- productivity effect is smaller (or more negative) if 
establishments perceive that labor regulations have affected their decisions on hiring or firing workers. 
25 For more details on establishment perceived obstacles, taxes, regulations, and other topics, including comparisons to countries in 
the region can be found in the Country Profiles, and accessed at http://www.enterprisesurveys.org/Reports.
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Regarding the perception of labor regulations as obstacles to production, the results are similar. 
Establishments that do not consider labor regulations as obstacles to production, less conflictive en-
vironments, show a more positive impact on productivity compared to establishments that consider 
labor regulations a moderate or serious obstacle to production.
Table 9. Labor Regulations and effect on Union Productivity effects
Argentina Bolivia Chile Mexico Panama Uruguay
Labor regulations and H/F decisions
%Workforce unionized -0.119 0.15 0.188 0.0862 0.377 -0.206
 x No H/F decision affected (0.414) (0.736) (0.399) (0.578) (0.288) (0.533)
%Workforce unionized -0.304+ -0.638 0.148 0.129 0.237 0.614^
 x H/F decision affected (0.031) (0.275) (0.411) (0.570) (0.697) (0.084)
Labor regulation as obstacles
%Workforce unionized -0.344 0.216 0.0975 0.0795 0.456 -0.006
 x No or minor obstacle (0.266) (0.681) (0.673) (0.595) (0.298) (0.982)
%Workforce unionized -0.407+ 0.051 0.428 0.0437 -0.0505 -0.649
 x Moderate obstacle (0.046) (0.933) (0.160) (0.877) (0.938) (0.325)
%Workforce unionized -0.175 -0.886 -0.112 0.289 0.791 0.669
 x Serious or v. serious obstacle (0.122) (0.134) (0.660) (0.195) (0.110) (0.209)
N 540 298 564 974 185 251
Note: ^ p<0.1, + p<0.05, * p<0.01. P-values in parentheses. All models are estimated using the full specification shown in Table 14.
An alternative explanation is rooted on the settings under which unions operate. O’Connell (1999) 
describes Argentinian unions to be highly centralized and protected by the government, which provi-
des unions with fewer incentives to internalize the costs of bargaining demands, potentially harming 
productivity. As noted in Anner (2008), unions in Argentina also have access to financial information 
of the employers, which can be used during bargaining. Access to this information may allow unions 
to better internalize the cost of increasing wages, providing incentives to engage contracts that benefit 
both workers and employers. In an environment of conflict, it is more likely that financial information 
is used to redirect resources toward higher wages (rent seeking behavior), reducing establishment’s 
flexibility to transfer resources to investment or innovation, reducing productivity. Given the unique 
situation of Argentina, there is little reason to suspect that unionized establishments will be at a di-
sadvantage in the domestic market, as unionized establishments primarily compete with each other.
The positive, albeit insignificant, union productivity effects seen in Chile can be associated with 
the decentralized collective bargaining system in this country. As Campero (2001) and Vergara (1998) 
describe, the decentralized bargaining system in Chile has allowed establishments to negotiate wage 
and benefits linked to specific productivity targets. This is consistent with O’Connell’s (1999) hypo-
thesis, which indicates that decentralized collective bargaining systems can increase productivity by 
allowing unions to internalize their externalities, facilitating their input in production process decisions. 
Our evidence shows, however, that once labor force structure characteristics are taken into account, 
the union-productivity relationship becomes statistically insignificant.
In the remaining countries, unions appear to have a positive but insignificant effect on productivity 
(Bolivia is an exception). It can be argued that the decentralized bargaining system in Panama, as in 
Chile, explains its large positive union productivity estimates, but large heterogeneity within Pana-
ma makes these estimates insignificant. In Bolivia, Mexico and Uruguay, where union-productivity 
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estimates are smaller, there are no specific reasons that might lead one to expect a highly positive 
or negative union effect. 
Uruguay has transitioned toward a decentralized bargaining system that tries to incorporate 
productivity clauses in their contracts (O’Connell 1999; Cassoni, et al. 2005), similar to the Chilean 
model. In Mexico, the combination of a centralized bargaining system, and conflicts between employers 
and unions, reflected in the violation of union rights, should have generated a negative productivity 
impact, which is not observed. In the case of Bolivia, the results show that unions have no net effect 
on productivity, and positive relationships are mainly driven by establishment characteristics, in par-
ticular the type of ownership. Then again, the presence and strength of unions might be too limited 
(compared to the other countries) to generate substantive pressure for productivity enhancements.
5.3. Robustness to Unionization measurements
Union density might contain measurement errors because employers, who may not have perfect 
information on union membership, report “guestimate” of union density in the establishment. In 
this case, a categorical union measure (say from 1 to 50; 51 to 100 percent, with zero unionization 
the omitted base group), may contain less measurement error than a continuous measure of union 
density does. Table 10 presents estimates using two alternative measures of unionization within 
establishments, using the same controls as in the full specification (Table 7). Although these results 
are informative regarding nonlinear effects of unions, the interpretation of some coefficients might 
be difficult as some countries, like Bolivia and Panama, might not have sufficient observations to 
identify the corresponding union effects.
Table 10. Effect of Unions on Establishment Productivity: Alternative Union Measures
 Argentina Bolivia Chile Mexico Panama Uruguay
 (1) 
%Workforce unionized -0.257+ -0.009 0.173 0.093 0.349 0.117
 (0.049)  (0.981)  (0.281)  (0.539)  (0.295)  (0.558)
% unionization 77.0% 82.5% 46.2% 76.8% 58.2% 52.2%
Avg effect on productivity -0.194 -0.007 0.082 0.071 0.198 0.066
 (2)
Union dummy -0.347* 0.0331 0.017 0.094 0.138 0.138
 (0.008)  (0.922)  (0.851)  (0.423)  (0.585)  (0.465)
 (3)
Less than 50% unionized -0.205 0.213 -0.055 0.156 0.010 0.226
 (0.232)  (0.773)  (0.609)  (0.374)  (0.978)  (0.362)
More than 50% unionized -0.379* 0.003 0.177 0.074 0.290 0.032
 (0.005)  (0.994)  (0.153)  (0.558)  (0.391)  (0.873)
Note: ^ p<0.1, + p<0.05, * p<0.01. P-values in parentheses. All models are estimated using the full specification shown in Table 14.
In the first part of Table 10, the results from the preferred model are used as reference. It includes 
information on the average unionization rate within union establishments to estimate the average 
union effect on productivity. The first alternative measure uses a dummy variable for unionization, 
and its coefficient can be interpreted as an average union-productivity effect. The estimates are 
somewhat consistent with the estimated average union impact observed in row 1. In Argentina, the 
average productivity effects using dummy variables are larger, in absolute value, than in the prefe-
rred specification. In Chile, on the other hand, while the previous estimate shows a large and positive 
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impact on productivity, the estimates using a dummy variable indicate that the effect is practically 
zero. This shows that there is some heterogeneity (nonlinearity) in the effects of unions across di-
fferent levels of unionization. 
An alternative measure is to estimate the union effects using dummy variables for different 
levels of unionization density in the establishment. While some cells are difficult to identify due to 
insufficient observations, this measurement is better capturing non-linear effects of unions. In Ar-
gentina, regardless of the level of unionization, the estimates are strongly negative, and increasing 
for establishments with higher unionization rates. In Mexico and Uruguay, the results suggest that 
some levels unionization (less than 50%) can have a positive impact on productivity. In contrast, for 
Chile and Panama, unionization is positively correlated with productivity for establishments with 
high rates of union density. Among establishments with low unionization rates, however, unions 
have either a negative or no relationship with productivity. 
6. CONCLUSIONS
This paper has aimed to fill some gaps in the literature by studying the effects that unions have on 
productivity and performance at the establishment level in selected countries in Latin America. These 
Latin American countries have been historically known for the strong role unions have played in their 
political and economic histories. Following periods of dictatorship, debt crisis and economic recovery, 
however, these countries developed in ways that have produced substantial heterogeneity in their 
collective bargaining systems and the roles that unions play in their economies. 
According to the results presented here, unions appear to have small but positive effects on pro-
ductivity across all countries in the sample, with the notable exception of Argentina, where a strong 
negative productivity effect is found, and Bolivia, where no effect is found. The positive relationships 
between unions and productivity appear to be sufficient to offset higher labor costs, translating in 
small and insignificant profitability estimates. In addition, with few exceptions, unions seem to have 
either a null or negative effect for current investment decisions.
While some of the observed effects can be linked to labor regulations, unions and managements 
conflicts, economic structure, or unionization organizations, no single narrative can readily explain 
all results presented here. Even at the establishment level, a precisely estimated union- productivity 
effect of zero is difficult to interpret, being consistent with unions having either no effect or having 
offsetting positive and negative effects. The empirical analyses presented here, however, provide an 
important step toward a better understanding of the role of unions in developing countries in Latin 
America, an area where there has been little prior evidence. Given the nature of the data and the 
limitations they place on modeling, the results presented here cannot be strictly represented as causal 
effects. Instead, they represent the best estimates of partial correlations that capture a portrait of the 
net outcomes resulting from unions and collective bargaining in these Latin American economies. 
With the development of new data, similar analysis can be extended to different regions and time 
frames, and can open the opportunity for future research that provides a more detailed analysis of 
the effects and channels through which unions affect establishment performance.
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APPENDIX A
Multiple Imputation using Chain Equations
In cases when the missing data structure follows an arbitrary missing pattern and simultaneous 
imputations of multiple variables are required, two standard imputation approaches can be used: mul-
tivariate normal imputation and imputations using chained equations (ICE). While the first approach 
estimates a model that tries to identify the underlying multivariate distribution, it imposes restrictions 
on the estimation, assuming the system follows a normal multivariate distribution. The ICE approach, 
by contrast, lacks a formal theoretical justification, but provides more flexibility in the specification of 
the imputation models, being consistent with different types of underlying distributional assumptions. 
The idea of the ICE approach is to construct univariate imputation models for each variable with 
missing information, using a fully conditional specification where all variables, other than the one being 
imputed, are used as independent variables. These conditional models are used to obtain predictions 
for the missing information, and can be used in subsequent iterations. In cases where the missing 
data structure follows an arbitrary pattern, an iterative imputation process is needed to account for 
possible dependence of the estimated parameters to the imputed data. Formally, the procedure can 
be described as follows.
Let X1 , X2 , ... , Xp be a set of variables with missing information (imputed variables), and let be a set 
of complete predictors. For each imputed variable, it is possible to construct a univariate imputation 
models , where each model can be a different distribution function (normal, logistic, etc), that best 
identifies the specific underlying distribution of the variable : 
Once the imputation models are specified for the first iteration, only complete observations are 
used for each individual model. Based on the imputation models, random draws using the empirical 
distribution of the imputed variables are obtained and used in the next iteration of the imputation 
until convergence is obtained. Although there is no specific rule on the number of imputations 
needed to obtain convergence of the system, the literature suggests that 10 iterations are typically 
sufficient to achieve convergence (van Buuren, 2007). However, depending on the complexity of the 
imputation system, more iterations may be needed. Once convergence is achieved, a random draw 
of the empirical process is obtained and used to create an imputed sample. This process is repeated 
for each additional set of imputed samples needed until M different imputed samples are created. 
Although the validity of the MI approach relies on the asymptotic properties of the imputation 
procedure with M approaching infinity, in practice fewer imputations are needed to obtain consistent 
and stables results. According to Rubin (1987), M=5 imputations should be sufficient to obtain valid 
inferences for most procedures, but depending on the amount of information missing and the type 
of analysis required, a larger set of imputed samples could be required. 
Xp    = fp (X1 | X1, X2, ... , Xp-1, Z, Өp)
t + 1 t t t
X2    = f2 (X1 | X1, ... , Xp, Z, Ө2)
t + 1 t t
X1    = f1 (X1 | X2, ... , Xp, Z, Ө1)
t + 1 t t
PP 30 | 71
Ecos de Economía: A Latin American Journal of Applied Economics | Vol. 21 | No. 44 | 2017
Unions and Economic Performance in Developing Countries: Case Studies from Latin America
Once M completed samples are obtained, each of them can be used to obtain M independent es-
timations for the desired model. Assume the model to be estimated can be written as:
such that we have a set of parameters βm and a variance covariance matrix ∑m for each imputed 
sample m. Following Rubin’s rule (Rubin, 1987) the results for the parameters and variance covariance 
matrices can be combined as follows:
Here, ~βM and 
~
∑M are the parameters and variance covariance matrix corresponding to the combi-
nation of models across the M imputed samples. See Rubin (1987) for more details.
APPENDIX B
Specification of Imputation Model
Table B1. Variables with Complete Information: 
Variable Definition
Part larger Indicates if the establishment if part of a larger firm
Public or private shareholding Indicates if the establishment has stocks in private hands or public stock exchange.
Foreign owned Indicates if more than 50% of the establishment is owned by foreign capital
% largest shareholder Indicates if the largest shareholder owns more than 50% of the establishment
Age Number of years since the establishment began operations
Manager experience Number of years of experience of top manager
Quality certification Indicates if establishments have an ISO quality certification
Electric problems Indicates if establishments have suffered 2 or more outages
Has a generator Indicates if establishments possess a generator
Electricity request Indicates if establishments have submitted a request for electricity connection
Water request Indicates if establishments have submitted a request for water connection
Water obstacle Indicates if establishments consider access to water as a major obstacle of production
Electricity obstacle Indicates if establishments consider access to electricity as a major obstacle of production
Mono production Indicates if all production comes from the main product
Sales export % of sales that come from export
Inputs from small 
establishments
%Inputs bought from smaller firms
Foreign input %Inputs imported
Principal buyer Indicates if consumers are main buyers from production
Customs and trades Indicates if Customs and trades regulations are an obstacle for operations
Own transport Indicates if establishment possess its own transportation system
Transport problem Indicates if transportation is considered a major obstacle for operation
Subcontract production %Sales that are subcontracted to other firms
Competition
Indicates the level of competition the establishment faces: None or one competitor (no 
competition), 2-5 competitors (medium competition), 5 or more competitors (high competition), 
operates on international market
ym = X'm βm + em for m = 1, ... , M
βM =
 
1
M  ∑ βm 
, and~ ~
∑M = 
1
M  ∑ ∑m
 + (1 +
 
1
M
 ) * ∑ 
~ ~ ~ ~(βm - βM) (βm - βM)'
M - 1
~ ~
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Variable Definition
Sales change Indicates if sales of main product have gone up or down in the last year
Prices change Indicates if prices of main product have gone up or down in the last years
Domestic Competition Pressure from domestic competitors on production costs is important
International Competition Pressure from international competitors on production costs is important
Foreign Technology Establishment uses foreign technology for their production
New product or New process
Indicates if the establishment introduced a new or significantly improved product/service or 
production process
Informality Indicates if informal markets are a consider a major obstacle for establishment operations
Share of Production Workers Share of Production workers as % of total permanent workers
Share of skill workers Share of Skill workers as % of total permanent workers
Share of seasonal workers Share of seasonal workers as % of total permanent equivalent workers
Share of female workers Share of Production workers as % of total permanent workers
Level of utilization of capital %of current output compared to maximum output possible under normal circumstances
Hours of operation per week Normal weekly hours of operations of the establishment, Includes the variable in levels and logs
New buildings
Indicates if establishment submitted an application to obtain a construction-related permit in 
last 2 years
Land problem Indicates if access to land is considered a major obstacle for operation
Government problem Indicates if government regulations are considered major obstacles for operation
Investment 
Indicates if establishment has investment any resources on machinery or vehicles during last 
fiscal year
Hires seasonal workers Indicates if establishment hires seasonal workers at all.
Industry fixed effects Includes industry fixed effects using ISIC Rev.3.1 classification to 2 digits.
Nr of permanent workers
Total number of permanent workers, including its logarithm, logarith squared and interaction 
with a union Dummy
Nr workers on t-1 Total number of permanent workers 3 years ago
Nr production workers Total number of workers directly engaged in the production process. Includes its log
Nr non production Workers Total number of workers not engaged in the production process. Includes its log
Zero production workers Indicates if there are no production workers in the establishment
Nr of seasonal workers
Nr of workers that are hired for a short-term (i.e. for less than a fiscal year), with no guarantee of 
renewal of employment contract. Includes its log and interaction with union dummy
Labor regulations Indicates if establishments consider labor regulations as major obstacles for operations
Inadequate Education Indicates if establishments consider inadequate education as major obstacles for operations
Manufacture production % of sales that come from manufacture
Refusal capital Indicate if the establishment refused to provide information on book or market capital values
Refusal land Indicate if the establishment refused to provide information on book or market land value
Log sales Logarithm of total sales in last fiscal year. Includes its square.
Sales in t-1 dummy Indicates if the establishment didn’t provide information on sales 3 years ago.
Union
Variables indicating if the establishment is unionized, the union density within the establishment 
and a dummy if more than 50% of the establishment is unionized. 
Information quality flags
Two dummies indicating if the interviewer perceives the information provided is true, or if the 
data was taken from administrative records.
Workers avg education
Average education attainment of typical worker. 0-3 yrs of education, 4-6 yrs of education, 7-12 
yrs of education and 13+ yrs of education
Training
Indicators of training among permanent workers: No active training program in the 
establishment, 0-33% of workers trained, 34-66% of workers trained and 67-100% workers 
trained.
Owner female Indicates if any of the main owners of the establishment is female.
Region Fixed effects using region dummies survey in each country. Varies across countries.
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Table B2. Imputed Variables: 
Variable Method Definition
Nr of workers in t-1 PMM Total number of permanent workers 3 years ago
Cost of labor PMM Total annual cost of labor as share of sales
Cost of electricity PMM Total annual cost of electricity as share of sales
Cost of communications PMM Total annual cost of communications as share of sales
Cost of materials and inputs PMM Total annual cost of materials and inputs as share of sales
Cost of fuel PMM Total annual cost of fuel as share of sales
Cost of transportation PMM Total annual cost of transportation as share of sales
Cost of water PMM Total annual cost of water as share of sales
Cost of rentals PMM Total annual cost of rent of equipment, building and land as share of sales
Log Nr of workers in t-1 OLS Log Total number of permanent workers 3 years ago
Log Sales in t-1 OLS Log Sales 3 years ago
Log wages production workers OLS Log average wage of production workers
Log wages non production workers OLS Log average wage of non-production workers
Log capital (book value) OLS Log of net book value of machinery
Log capital (market value) OLS Log of hypothetical cost of purchase of machinery
Log materials and inputs OLS Log of total cost of material and inputs
Log salaries OLS Log of total cost of salaries
OLS: This method uses linear predictions (plus the empirical standard error) to impute the values of the missing values.
PMM: This method uses linear predictions to match observations with missing values to those with complete information. The 
observed values are then used for the imputation.
Table B3. Other Measurements:
Variable Definition
Log value added pc Value added is defined as sales minus costs on materials and inputs, electricity, fuel and water. It is 
divided by total equivalent permanent workers.
Log total equivalent 
permanent workers
Total equivalent workers are estimated as total permanent workers plus equivalent seasonal workers. 
Equivalent seasonal workers are estimated as total number of temporary/seasonal workers multiplied 
by the average time (in months) a temporal worker participates in the establishment in a year. 
Log capital per capita Log of hypothetical value of capital divided by total number of equivalent workers. Hypothetical value 
captures the market value of capital, or how much the establishment would pay for it in current state. 
Profit Price cost margin, defined as total sales minus total production costs, divided by total costs.
Sales growth Defined as the difference between current log sales, and log sales three years ago
Investment in R&D Indicates if the establishment has spent on research and development
Investment in capital Indicates if the establishment has bought any fixed assets in the previous period
PP 33 | 71
Ecos de Economía: A Latin American Journal of Applied Economics | Vol. 21 | No. 44 | 2017
Unions and Economic Performance in Developing Countries: Case Studies from Latin America
APPENDIX C
Effect of Unions on Establishment Productivity, by Country 
Basic Brown and Medoff Specification
 Argentina Bolivia Chile Mexico Panama Uruguay
       
%Workforce unionized -0.377^ 0.488 0.227 0.061 0.304 0.188
 (0.057)  (0.166)  (0.212)  (0.675)  (0.367)  (0.409)
Log capital pc -0.009 0.260* 0.232* 0.249* 0.017 -0.03
 (0.914)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.814)  (0.678)
Log total labor force 0.201* 0.077 0.172* 0.164* 0.126 0.396*
 (0.000)  (0.426)  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.101)  (0.000)
Constant 9.308* 5.668* 6.949* 6.680* 9.188* 8.166*
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)
Observations 540 298 564 974 185 251
Notes: ^ p<0.1, + p<0.05, * p<0.01. P-values in parentheses. Models include region and broad industry fixed effects
PP 34 | 71
Ecos de Economía: A Latin American Journal of Applied Economics | Vol. 21 | No. 44 | 2017
Unions and Economic Performance in Developing Countries: Case Studies from Latin America
REFERENCES
Aidt, T., and Tzannatos, Z. (2002). Unions and Collective Bargaining: Economic Effects in a Global Environ-
ment. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.
Addison, J. T., and Hirsch, B. T. (1989). Union Effects on Productivity, Profits, and Growth: Has the Long Run 
Arrived? Journal of Labor Economics, 7(1), 72-105. 
Aitken, B., Harrison, A., and Lipsey, R. E. (1996). Wages and foreign ownership A comparative study of Mexico, 
Venezuela, and the United States. Journal of International Economics, 40 (3–4), 345-371. 
Alexander, R. J., and Parker, E. M. (2005). A History of Organized Labor in Bolivia. Westport, CT: Praeger Pub 
Text.
Allen, S. G. (1984). Unionized Construction Workers Are More Productive. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
99 (2), 251-274. 
Anner, M. (2008). Meeting the Challenges of Industrial Restructuring: Labor Reform and Enforcement in Latin 
America. Latin American Politics and Society, 50(2), 33-65. 
Baldwin, C. Y. (1983). Productivity and Labor Unions: An Application of the Theory of Self- Enforcing Contracts. 
The Journal of Business, 56 (2), 155-185. 
Black, S. E., and Lynch, L. M. (2001). How to Compete: The Impact of Workplace Practices and Information 
Technology on Productivity. Review of Economics and Statistics, 83 (3), 434-445. 
Bloom, N., and Reenen, J. V. (2011). Chapter 19 Human Resource Management and Productivity. In O. Ashen-
felter and D. Card (Eds.), Handbook of Labor Economics (Vol. Volume 4, Part B, pp. 1697-1767): Else-
vier.
Brown, C., and Medoff, J. (1978). Trade Unions in the Production Process. The Journal of Political Economy, 86 
(3), 355-378. 
Campero, G. (2001). Trade union responses to globalization: Chile. Discussion Paper DP/126/2001. Interna-
tional Institute for Labour Studies. 
Carrière, J., Haworth, N., and Roddick, J. (1989). The State, Industrial Relations and the Labour Movement in 
Latin America. New York: St. Martin’s Press.
Cassoni, A., Allen, S. G., and Labadie, G. J. (2004). Unions and Employment in Uruguay. In J. Heckman and C. 
Pages (Eds.), Law and Employment: Lessons from Latin American and the Caribbean: University of 
Chicago Press.
Cassoni, A., Labadie, G, J., and Fachola, G. (2005). The Economic Effects of Unions in Latin America: Their 
Impact on Wages and the Economic Performance in Uruguay. In P. Kuhn and G. Márquez (Eds.), What 
Difference Do Unions Make? Their Impact on Productivity and Wages in Latin America: Inter-American 
Development Bank.
Christensen, L. R., Jorgenson, D. W., and Lau, L. J. (1973). Transcendental Logarithmic Production Frontiers. 
The Review of Economics and Statistics, 55 (1), 28-45. 
Connolly, R. A., Hirsch, B. T., and Hirschey, M. (1986). Union Rent Seeking, Intangible Capital, and Market Value 
of the Firm. The Review of Economics and Statistics, 68 (4), 567-577. 
DiNardo, J., and Lee, D. S. (2004). Economic Impacts of New Unionization on Private Sector Employers: 1984–
2001. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 119(4), 1383-1441. 
Doucouliagos, C., and Laroche, P. (2003). What do Unions do to Productivity? A Meta-Analysis. Industrial 
Relations: A Journal of Economy and Society, 42 (4), 650-691. 
Doucouliagos, C., and Laroche, P. (2009). Unions and Profits: A Meta-Regression Analysis. Industrial Rela-
tions: A Journal of Economy and Society, 48 (1), 146-184
Doucouliagos, C., and Laroche, P. (2013). Unions and Innovation: New Insights From the Cross-Country Evi-
dence. Industrial Relations: A Journal of Economy and Society, 52 (2), 467-491. 
PP 35 | 71
Ecos de Economía: A Latin American Journal of Applied Economics | Vol. 21 | No. 44 | 2017
Unions and Economic Performance in Developing Countries: Case Studies from Latin America
Edwards, S. (1989). The Debt Crisis and Economic Adjustment in Latin America. Latin American Research 
Review, 24(3), 172-186. 
Fairris, D. (2003). Unions and Wage Inequality in Mexico. Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 56 (3), 481-
497. 
Fairris, D. (2006). Union Voice Effects in Mexico. British Journal of Industrial Relations, 44 (4), 781-800. 
Falaris, E. M. (2008). A Quantile Regression Analysis of Wages in Panama. Review of Development Economics, 
12 (3), 498-514.
Freeman, R. B. (2010). Chapter 70 Labor Regulations, Unions, and Social Protection in Developing Countries: 
Market Distortions or Efficient Institutions?. In D. Rodrik and M. Rosenzweig (Eds.), Handbook of De-
velopment Economics (Vol. Volume 5, pp. 4657-4702): Elsevier.
Freeman, R. B., and Medoff, J. L. (1984). What Do Unions Do? (Vol. 23): Basic Books New York.
Fuchs, V. R., Krueger, A. B., and Poterba, J. M. (1998). Economists’ Views About Parameters, Values, and Poli-
cies: Survey Results in Labor and Public Economics. Journal of Economic Literature, 36(3), 1387-1425. 
Graham, J. W., Hofer, S. M., Donaldson, S. I., MacKinnon, D. P., and Schafer, J. L. (1997). Analysis with missing 
data in prevention research The science of prevention: Methodological advances from alcohol and 
substance abuse research (pp. 325-366).
Hayter, S., and Stoevska, V. (2011). Social Dialogue Indicators: International Statistical Inquiry 2008-09. Tech-
nical Brief. International Labour Office. 
Hirsch, B. T. (1991). Labor Unions and the Economic Performance of Firms. Kalamazoo, Michigan: Upjohn 
Institute for Economic Research.
Hirsch, B. T. (2004). What do Unions do for Economic Performance?. Journal of Labor Research, 25 (3), 415-455. 
Hirsch, B. T. (2008). Sluggish Institutions in a Dynamic World: Can Unions and Industrial Competition Coex-
ist?. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 22(1), 153-176.
Hirsch, B. T., and Addison, J. T. (1986). The Economic Analysis of Unions: New Approaches and Evidence: Allen 
and Unwin.
Hirsch, B. T., and Connolly, R. A. (1987). Do Unions Capture Monopoly Profits?. Industrial and Labor Relations 
Review, 41 (1), 118-136. 
Horton, N. J., and Lipsitz, S. R. (2001). Multiple Imputation in Practice. The American Statistician, 55 (3), 244-
254. 
Hudson, R. A. (Ed.). (1994). Chile: A Country Study. Washington, D.C.: Federal Research Division, Library of 
Congress.
Hudson, R. A., and Hanratty, D. M. (Eds.). (1991). Bolivia: A Country Study. Washington, D.C. : Federal Research 
Division, Library of Congress.
Hudson, R. A., and Meditz, S. W. (Eds.). (1992). Uruguay: A Country Study. Washington, D.C. : Federal Research 
Division, Library of Congress.
ITUC. (2007). Annual Survey of Violations of Trade Union Rights. http://survey07.ituc-csi.org/getcontinent.
php?IDContinent=0&IDLang=EN
Kaufman, B. E. (2004). What Unions Do: Insights From Economic Theory. Journal of Labor Research, 25(3), 
351-382. 
Kleiner, M. M., Leonard, J. S., and Pilarski, A. M. (2002). How industrial relations affects plant performance : 
the case of commercial aircraft manufacturing. Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 55 (2), 195-218. 
Kuhn, P. (1985). Union Productivity Effects and Economic Efficiency. Journal of Labor Research, 6 (3), 229. 
Kuhn, P. (1998). Unions and the Economy: What We Know; What We Should Know. The Canadian Journal of 
Economics / Revue canadienne d’Economique, 31 (5), 1033-1056. 
Lee, D. and Mas A. (2012). Long-Run Impacts of Unions on Firms: New Evidence from Financial Markets, 1961–
1999. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 127 (1) , 333–378.
PP 36 | 71
Ecos de Economía: A Latin American Journal of Applied Economics | Vol. 21 | No. 44 | 2017
Unions and Economic Performance in Developing Countries: Case Studies from Latin America
Little, R. J. A., and Rubin, D. B. (2002). Statistical analysis with missing data (2nd ed. ed.). New York: John Wiley 
and Sons.
Machin, S., and Wadhwani, S. (1991). The Effects of Unions on Investment and Innovation: Evidence From 
Wirs. The Economic Journal, 101 (405), 324-330. 
Mansilla, H. C. F. (1993). Apogeo y Declinacion del Movimiento Sindical Boliviano. Revista de Estudios Politicos 
(79), 227-245. 
Meditz, S. W., and Hanratty, D. M. (Eds.). (1989). Panama: a country Study: Federal Research Division, Library 
of Congress.
Menezes-Filho, N., Zylberstajn, H., Chahad, J. P., and Pazello, E. (2005). Unions and the Economic Perfor-
mance of Brazilian Establishments. In P. Kuhn and G. Márquez (Eds.), What Difference Do Unions 
Make? Their Impact on Productivity and Wages in Latin America: Inter-American Development Bank.
Merrill, T., and Miró, R. (Eds.). (1997). Mexico: A Country Study. Washington, D.C.: Federal Research Division, 
Library of Congress.
Murillo, M. V. (2000). From Populism to Neoliberalism: Labor Unions and Market Reforms in Latin America. 
World Politics, 52 (2), 135-174. 
Murillo, M. V., and Schrank, A. (2005). With a Little Help from my Friends. Comparative Political Studies, 38 
(8), 971-999. 
O’Connell, L. D. (1999). Collective Bargaining Systems in 6 Latin American Countries: Degrees of Autonomy 
and Decentralization. Inter-American Development Bank, Office of the Chief Economist, Working pa-
per, 399. 
OECD. (1996). Trade, Employment and Labour Standards: A Study of Core Workers’ Rights and International 
Trade. Paris France: OECD Publishing.
Rios-Avila, F. and Hirsch B.T. (forthcoming). Unions, Wages Gaps and Wage Dispersion: New Evidence from the 
Americas. Industrial Relations: A Journal of Economy and Society.
Ronconi, L. (2012). Globalization, Domestic Institutions, and Enforcement of Labor Law: Evidence from Latin 
America. Industrial Relations: A Journal of Economy and Society, 51(1), 89-105. 
Rubin, D. B. (1987). Multiple imputation for nonresponse in surveys. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 
Saavedra, J., and Torero, M. (2005). Union Density Changes and Union Effects on Firm Performance in Peru. 
In P. Kuhn and G. Márquez (Eds.), What Difference Do Unions Make? Their Impact on Productivity and 
Wages in Latin America: Inter-American Development Bank.
Turnbull, P. J. (1991). Trade Unions and Productivity: Opening the Harvard “Black Boxes”. Journal of Labor Re-
search, 12 (2), 135-150. 
Ulloa, V. (2003). El Movimiento Sindical Chileno del Siglo XX Hasta Nuestros Días: OIT, Oficina Internacional 
del Trabajo. Textos de Capacitacion.
Urizar H., C., and Lee, S. (2005). The Effects of Unions on Productivity: Evidence From Large Coffee Producers 
in Guatemala. In P. Kuhn and G. Márquez (Eds.), What Difference Do Unions Make? Their Impact on 
Productivity and Wages in Latin America: Inter-American Development Bank.
van Buuren, S. (2007). Multiple imputation of discrete and continuous data by fully conditional specification. 
Statistical Methods in Medical Research, 16 (3), 219-242. 
Vergara, M. (1998). Incremento de Remuneraciones Asociados a Aumentos de Productividad Aportes al De-
bate Laboral 5. Department of Labor: Chile. 
Wessels, W. J. (1994). Do Unionized Firms Hire Better Workers? Economic Inquiry, 32 (4), 616-629.
World Bank (2006). Latin American Enterprise Surveys Data set. World Bank, Washington, DC. Available at 
http://www.enterprisesurveys.org/Data
